I The Problem

The relationship between mind and language has been one of the main problems of analytic philosophy.

In the earlier period, the problem has been raised mainly by theoretical concerns. We, human beings, use language to communicate with others. John said, “I want a glass of water.” Jane understood the sentence and brought one. Such a linguistic communication is sometimes established even among different language natives. Upon hearing John’s statement, Hanako, who stood near the refrigerator, could bring the water. In this case, she understood that he would have said in Japanese “Watashi wa mizu ga hoshii.” A satisfactory theory of language should be able to explain such an instance as well. In these examples of linguistic communication, there seems to be something that John intends to tell and Jane and that Hanako can understand. That “something” would be called the “meaning” of the sentence. Since John’s, Jane’s and Hanako’s minds are different, many claim that “meaning” cannot be explained by some entity existing in the mind.

In the later period, the problem has also been raised by developmental concerns. It seems that human beings, unlike other animals, do not have difficulties in mastering language and using it. From this fact, some infer that there is some innate capacity for using language in the human mind. Others claim that the use of language should affect the way of thinking or of grasping the world. Use of lan-
language is a significant step in the developmental process that differentiates human beings from other animals. The human way of grasping the world should be very different from that of other animals and is perhaps already linguistic in some manner.

As is observed in history, there are three radically different approaches toward the problem. The first approach holds that language is explained by language-independent representations (often associated with “pictures”) in the mind. This approach can be called “traditional” in the sense that many analytic philosophers believe that this view has been uncritically accepted for a long time.

The “traditional” approach has been challenged by the second approach, which can be called the “analytic” approach. Frege, who is regarded as the father of analytic philosophy, notably claims that language cannot be explained by any “representation” (Vorstellung) in the mind but rather by some entities outside the mind such as the “sense” (Sinn) or the “thought” (Gedanke) in addition to the “reference” (Bedeutung). The “analytic” approach attempts to explain language independently from the mind and therefore also from the objects that the mind represents.

The third approach supports some kind of interdependence between the mind and language. And this is the approach that Aristotle and Boethius indeed endorse. For Aristotle and Boethius, the fact that functions of the mind somehow explain language does not make for any explanatory difficulty. The “analytic” approach presupposes that the mind is private and that, therefore, something existing in the mind does not contribute in any way to theory of meaning and truth. Aristotle and Boethius would reject this presupposition for two reasons. First, each individual mind is not completely private because it shares the same linguistic structure of thinking with other minds. Second, each individual mind is not completely private because something existing in the mind can be formally identical with any object in the world.

My contribution in this project is a philosophical introduction to
Boethius’ theory of language, defending it against an “analytic” approach to language. In order to make the project feasible in a limited time, I will concentrate upon Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias. I will discuss some of the important issues in the philosophy of language found in the commentary. There has been a significant lack of studies on Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle. There are only a few works that treat Boethius’ theory of language in his commentary on Peri hermeneias. Most of them are very brief and lack accuracy and depth in philosophical analysis.

In order to accomplish my goal, I will undertake four steps. First, I will introduce “analytic” presentations of Boethius’ theory of meaning and truth. Second, I will outline and evaluate Boethius’ theory of meaning and truth while assessing the “analytic” readings. Third, I will outline and evaluate other parts of Boethius’ theory of language in order to prepare for a defense of Boethius’ position from the “analytic” approach. Fourth, I will argue against the “analytic” approach and defend Boethius’ philosophical position.

II Review of Related Literatures

With the exception of Boethius’ exposition of chapter I i.e. “sea-battle argument,” not very much has been written on Boethius’ Commentary on Peri hermeneias. In spite of the important role of Boethius in the history of Latin Aristotle, there has been a significant lack of scholarly literature. But in general, we can identify two inclinations in the scholarly literature: ( ) One distorts Boethius’ philosophical contribution by its “analytic” interests. By “analytic,” I mean specifically the views taken by early analytic philosophers such as Frege, Russell, and Carnap, giving attention to the fact that, for them, “anti-psychologism,” “formalism,” and “the superiority of the meta-language over natural languages” were dominant themes. ( ) The other fails to appreciate Boethius’ originalities by its concerns for such historical contexts as that of the Stoics or that of
Neoplatonism. Norman Kretzmann and Mark Sullivan would be classified in the first group and John Magee and Lambert De Rijk in the second group, though each of them shares the other inclination as well.

Norman Kretzmann paid special attention to Boethius’ Commentary on Peri hermeneias. He made a relatively reliable English translation of part (chapter 1) of the commentary. However, the translation sometimes reveals his “analytic” reading. For instance, he translates “thing” (res) into “a thing, a fact, a states of affairs,” and “converted” (converti) into “correspond.” These renderings make us feel as if we could find Russell or early Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in Boethius’ text, that is, the correspondence theory of truth.

In his articles “History of Semantics” (をご覧ください), “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of propositio” (をご覧ください), and “Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention” (をご覧ください), Kretzmann consistently claims that Boethius’ mistranslation and misinterpretation of Aristotle’s On Interpretation made remarkable differences to the history of semantics. Since these articles are the basis for later discussions, I will here introduce his essential theses and questions concerning Boethius’ commentary:

[Kretzmann’s thesis 1=KT1] According to Kretzmann, Boethius’ mistranslation of chapter one of Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias supported misreading of this passage in the subsequent ages.

In chapter one, Aristotle says:

“Εστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τά γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, καὶ ἐσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πάσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταῦτα πάσι παθημάτα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἢδη ταῦτα.

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds.
But what these are in the first place signs of —affections of the soul— are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of —actual things— are also the same.

And here is Boethius’ Latin translation of the passage:

Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce. Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eadem voces; quorum autem hae primorum notae, eadem omnibus passione animae sunt, et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eadem.

As is observed above, Boethius, in his Latin translation, assigns the same word “note” (nota) both to “symbol” (symbolon) and to “sign” (oseion) in Aristotle’s text. Against Bonitz and many translators, Kretzmann claims that the “symbol” and the “sign” are not synonymous here; the “symbol” involves the conventional and artificial character of signification whereas the “sign” involves the natural character of signification. Boethius’ Latin translation blurs the distinction.

In his commentary on the part translated as such, Boethius explains that Aristotle is right to say that spoken words are primarily the signs (notae) of mental entities, since they are uttered for the purpose of signifying those mental entities, not for the purpose of signifying things, although a name is indeed imposed on a thing and spoken words are names of things. In short, spoken words primarily designate thoughts and secondarily the things themselves.

Now Kretzmann argues, contrary to what Boethius suggests in his commentary, that the passage in Aristotle contains no claim at all about a relationship of spoken sounds to actual things if one takes the difference between the “symbol” and the “sign” seriously into the account. Together with his textual emendation “protos” instead of “proton,” Kretzmann finds Aristotle’s message in the text to be that
spoken words are primarily signs of mental entities and are secondarily symbols of them. The secondary relation is what makes spoken words language, differentiating them from mere noises made by animals such as groans and grunts. Thus, according to Kretzmann, Aristotle endorses “conventionalism” in *Peri hermeneias*. That is why Aristotle begins chapter 2 with the statement that “a name is a spoken sound significant by convention.”

**[Kretzmann’s thesis 2=KT2]** In his commentary, Boethius formulates Aristotle’s definition of categorical sentences by saying that “the enunciation is a significative voice signifying (significans) true and false.” According to Kretzmann, “signifying” (significans) here is a technical expression which began with Boethius, distinguishing that which signs convey from that for which any sign may stand. In formulating the definition with the word “signifying” instead of “saying” (discens), Boethius was under the influence of Stoicism; the Stoic *axioma* is a *lekton* that is either true or false, and a *lekton* is a *semainomenon*, or a thing signified (significatum). Now Kretzmann claims that there are two major streams of medieval logic, “dictism” and “terminism,” which are understood as “a theory of propositional sense” and as “a theory of propositional reference” respectively. “Dictism” would have its origin in Peter Abelard’s doctrine of dictum. The “dictum” is “what is said,” that which can be a bearer of truth-values and of modalities. The “dictum” is different from a mental entity and also from a thing itself. “Terminism,” on the other hand, would the movement that had its maturity among the thinkers such as William of Ockham. “Terminism” focus upon the property of terms that is called “appellation” (in the early stage) and “supposition” (in the later stage). They analyze what the term names (appellat) and what the term stands for (supponit pro) in different propositional contexts. For them, reference or denotation was far more important than the more abstract notion of signification. Based on the classification of
medieval logic, he argues that Boethius opens the way of “dictism,” which is otherwise called the “Boethian tradition,” by its contrast with “terminism” or “Aristotelian tradition.”

Besides these two theses, Kretzmann raises questions concerning Boethius’ philosophical position. In his explanation of the above passages in chapter one, Boethius introduces three types of speech (orationes), one written in letters, another uttered in the voice, and a third in the mind. Now if there are three types of speech, the parts of speech are no doubt likewise threefold. Since the noun and the verb are the principal parts of speech, there will be some nouns and verbs that are written, others that are spoken, and still others that are silent and employed by the mind. Kretzmann complains that vagueness remains in this account.

[Kretzmann’s problem 1=KP1] It is not clear whether there are two completely different sets of nouns and verbs, one for writing and one for speaking.

[Kretzmann’s problem 2=KP2] It is not clear whether this mental speech is nothing more than silently running over a sentence in Latin or English, or whether it is a non-verbal operation, such as Augustine’s “inward locution.”

Later, Magee and De Rijk expressed their considerations about Kretzmann’s interpretation in their contributions to the study of Boethius’ semantics. Disagreeing with Kretzmann in some details, De Rijk and Magee, who explicitly attributes a correspondence theory of truth to Boethius, turn out to stand under the influence of Kretzmann.

[Reactions to KT1] In a footnote of his dissertation, Truth, Discourse and Mind in Boethius, Magee supports Kretzmann’s interpretation of Aristotle as well founded. In his later publication of a part of his dissertation, Boethius on Signification and Mind, however, he maintains a different reading from Kretzmann’s.
He reads “the first things” (proton) taking them as “the first intellects” (prota noemata) in chapter Ⅲ of De anima III, where Kretzmann (κρετσμάν) argues for “principally or directly” (protos). Moreover, together with a reference to Cicero’s text, he claims that Boethius’ lexical change does not represent “the Nature-Convention antithesis,” namely the thesis that Boethius’ use of “note” (nota) destroys the original distinction between the natural and artificial sign. Still, he seems to be sympathetic with Kretzmann in his conclusion: “That the Boethian translation did in fact suppress the symbol-sign difference and that it was highly influential upon thinkers of the Middle Ages are matters of fact, and must be acknowledged as such.”

In “On Boethius’ Notion of Being: A Chapter of Boethian Semantics” (οσο θεμέλησι), De Rijk explicitly claims that Kretzmann is right in seeing Aristotle’s “conventionalism” in the word “by convention” (kata syntheken) (κατά σύνθεσιν). However, he insists that Boethius, following the Hellenistic tradition, shares the same view as Aristotle. The fact is observed in Boethius’ rendering the phrase “that are in the voice” (τά ἐν οἰκείᾳ) as “the voice being conditioned in a certain manner” (vox certo modo sese habens). Thanks to his Greek predecessors who are fully aware of the differences between symbolon and semeion, Boethius much emphasizes the artificial character of the “spoken sounds” (φωνή) and “written marks” (γράμμα) in his explanations of the passage. De Rijk claims that the “sign” (ἑρμηνεία) (σημεῖον) in Aristotle’s text is in its generic usage, which comprises both natural and artificial signs. Unlike Kretzmann, De Rijk concludes that the effect of Boethius’ mistranslation is not so historically dramatic.

[Reactions to KT2] Through his textual survey, Magee shows that “significare” connotes reference as well as sense, and the connotation should be specified in each context. Thus Magee seems to say that “significare” does not have any technical sense by itself. However, Magee seems to agree with Kretzmann in concluding that Boethius’
commentary implicitly supports the "theory of propositional sense," or "dictism." Magee claims that Boethius commits himself to an implicit distinction between "sense (meaning, connotation, intension) and reference (or denotation, extension)" when he distinguished the different intentions of Aristotle's two logical treatises, i.e. Peri hermeneias and the Categories. According to Boethius, the former treatise is concerned with the manner in which propositions made up of nouns and verbs signify thoughts in the mind while the latter is concerned with the manner in which significant utterances refer to things outside the mind.

In reviewing this literature, a number of important questions arise. The following is a list of those questions:

- "Does the sense-reference distinction really exist in Boethius?"
- "Is there no theory of meaning in Boethius?"
- "Is Boethius a correspondence theorist of truth?"
- "Did Boethius bring about a radical change in the history of semantics through his interpretation of Aristotle?"
- "Given the fact that Boethius develops a psychological explanation of the language as ‘mental speech,’ should we reject his approach toward language a philosophically wrong?"

Through my research, I will keep these questions in my mind, while assessing Kretzmann’s theses and considering solutions to his problems.

**III Procedure**

My research will be textually based. It will require a careful reading of relevant texts with philological assessment and philosophical analysis of the arguments and positions expressed in these texts. Based on careful reading, I will offer my own argument to defend or criticize Boethius.
Boethius wrote two commentaries on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias. According to De Rijk's chronological studies of Boethius' logical works, the first commentary is dated after and the second commentary is dated about . I will basically focus upon the second commentary, which has more detailed explanations than the first one. Charles Meiser’s edition is the only critical edition of these commentaries currently available. The edition is quite reliable although it sometimes has unnecessary corrections. Using this critical edition, I will mention those passages where I find readings different from Meiser’s.

I will undertake my philosophical analysis with clear definitions of technical terms. Scholars sometimes discuss their interpretations of Boethius without any definition of terms such as “conventionalism.” Based on the relevant texts, no one disagrees that both Aristotle and Boethius endorse the conventional character of human language. This, however, does not automatically imply that they endorse “conventionalism.” “Conventionalism” is a claim that language is nothing but conventional stipulation.

Through this investigation, my research will also pay attention to historical influence. With regards to this, my project will be involved in two major discussions.

First, I will offer some response to the discussion concerning whether Boethius himself is a thinker of any originality. Not a few scholars have insisted that Boethius is not an original thinker and different scholars have pointed out different influences on Boethius. Since my project is very limited in its scope, treating only one of Boethius' various works, I will not give a definite solution to the larger problem. Rather, I will express critical considerations about such historical influences as can be found in the commentary.

Second, there is growing scholarly discussion over how Aristotle's thought has passed into European history and has influenced Later Western thought. Boethius is, as is well known, one of the earliest and most important Latin translators of and commentators on
Aristotle’s corpus. I will point out differences, if any, between Aristotle’s Greek text and Boethius’ Latin translation.

I will undertake my principal investigations in the following order. I will begin my investigation by introducing Kretzmann’s interpretation and questions. I will show how later interpretations taken by Magee and De Rijk are under Kretzmann’s influence. Then, I will criticize them with textual evidence. For instance, as has been already pointed out by his critics, there is no textual foundation for Kretzmann’s “philological basis” for his hypothesis [KT 1], namely the distinction between “sign” and “symbol” as a natural sign and an artificial sign. And the philological analysis would support the adjective “proton” rather than his reading of the adverb “protos.” Even having “protos” in place of “proton,” it is not necessary to accept Kretzmann’s reading and, indeed, it is difficult to have the reading in context. My analysis will show that neither Aristotle nor Boethius is a supporter of “conventionalism” in the proper sense of the word. In general, Boethius is highly faithful to Aristotle. “Signify” does not have any technical sense as “connote,” distinguished from “refer” in Boethius. Neither Aristotle nor Boethius makes any distinction between sense and reference in Fregean manner. The “thought” (intellectus) in Boethius is the reference as well as the sense of the sentence.

Boethius’ answer to Kretzmann’s first problem [KP 1] is obviously given in his text. Boethius claims that the thoughts in the soul, that is, the speech that is going on in the intellect, are identical and unchanging for all; The thought (intellectus) about a horse is common among the Greeks, the Romans, and the barbarians while the voices (voces) which express the thought are different. Thus mental speech is not developed in a particular natural language but rather is common to all human beings of different languages, being developed prior to any natural language. So far, Boethius’ theory of mental speech retains some similarity to that of the “language of thought” proposed by Jerry Fodor.
Given that the noun and the verb in vocal written, and mental speech share the same form and are different in matter, that is, in voices, letters, and mental entities, Kretzmann’s second problem [KP 2] will be easily answered. This interpretation is supported by the following passage in Boethius’ commentary, i.e. “just as the intellect is a cause of the voices or the voice is a cause of the letters.” In this passage, the “cause” in question is to be taken as a formal cause.

This consideration of Kretzmann’s interpretation will furnish a platform for the following theses: Boethius’ commentary on chapter of Peri hermeneias proposes an interesting view of the relationship between mind, language and reality. Language conveys the thought in the mind, while thought itself has a linguistic nature. If the language and the thought are true, the thought and the language which expresses the thought are formally identical with reality or the things in the world. Hence, language should reveal reality, that is, the way things are in the world. I will show how this is the case under different topics, for instance, in Boethius’ distinction between the noun and the verb and in his notion of the unity of a sentence. Boethius’ philosophical investigation of language (which he calls “logic”) is more than a purely grammatical or syntactic consideration of natural languages for a “universal grammar” as is understood by Noam Chomsky. In the case of the unity of a sentence, for example, Boethius makes the distinction between “one (unum)—many (multus)” and “simple (simplex)—composite (compositus).” He claims that the unity of a sentence is related to the former pair, which is measured by the unity of the thing that the sentence signifies, not by the number of the noun and the verb contained in the sentence. To put it concisely, in every case, Boethius claims that any philosophical (that is, “logical”) distinction has its foundations in reality.

Finally, I will attempt to show that Boethius’ view of mind and language has remarkable philosophical strength, contrary to some rather negative evaluations of Boethius by “analytic” treatment.
Boethius’ commentary has philosophical significance not because he is a predecessor of the sense-reference or the token-type distinctions, but because he, as well as Aristotle, is not taking such an “analytic” approach to language. In his “Logical Atomism,” Bertrand Russell claims:

“The purpose of the foregoing discussion of an ideal logical language (which would of course be wholly useless for daily life) is twofold: first, to prevent inferences from the nature of language to the nature of the world, which are fallacious because they depend upon the defects of language.”

For Russell, a distinction in natural language such as a noun and a verb is potentially fallacious since it misinforms us as to the nature of the world. Boethius’ view of language and reality suggests exactly the opposite. Inferences from the nature of the natural language to the nature of the world are justified because natural language is so constituted as to reflect the nature of the world.

In his “Meaning and Truth,” P. F. Strawson describes “Homeric struggles” in semantics: on the one side, Grice, Austin and the later Wittgenstein and Chomsky, Frege, and the earlier Wittgenstein on the other. The former group, that is, the intentional semanticists, claim that meaning is determined by the speaker’s intention while the latter group, that is, the extensional semanticists claim that meaning is determined by truth-conditions. After the description of the “struggles,” Strawson suggests:

“Reference, direct or indirect, to belief-expression is inseparable from the analysis of saying something true (or false). And as I have tried to show, it is unrealistic to the point of unintelligibility—or, at least of extreme perversity—to try to free the notion of
the linguistic expression of belief from all essential connection with the concept of communication-intention.”

In Aristotle-Boethius’ line of thought, it is indeed not necessary to take one of these two approaches. The meaning of a sentence is an expression of our thought and, if the sentence is true, the thought is identical with the extension of the sentence. The meaning of a sentence is merely an expression of our thought (for example, in the sentence “a goat-stag is an animal”) if the sentence is false. In short, the meaning of a sentence is determined by thought and by its extension.

With these examples from analytic literature, I will clear up misrepresentations of and misaccusations about Boethius’ theory of language often taken as a “traditional” approach to language. Moreover, I will claim that Boethius’ theory makes much more sense of what we actually do in our linguistic communication rather than “analytic” approach to language.

Notes
1) Sullivan proposes that there might be a distinction between “sentence-type” and “sentence-token” in Boethius as well as in Apuleius. Rejected by Nuchelmann and Magee, his interpretation is not now taken seriously.
2) Kretzmann tends to emphasize the influence of the Stoics. Sullivan suggests the influence of Apuleius, a middle-Platonist. Magee and De Rijk sometimes follow Kretzmann’s “analytic” interpretation.
3) Published in Blank and Kretzmann.
5) Kretzmann.
6) In my research, I will use the Greek text in Minio-Paulello considering also the variants.
7) In this paper, I will basically quote the English translation in Ackrill which is highly accurate.
8) Minio-Paluello informs us that Boethius made several versions of the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias as he made pro-
gresses in his commentary project. In my research, I will rely upon the final version of his Latin translation edited by Minio-Paluello.

9) Kretzmann ̕ʣ Kretzmann ̕ʣ Kretzmann ̕ʣ

“A[ ]am cum ea quae sunt in voce res intellectusque significant, principaliter quidem intellectus, res vero quas ipsa intelligentia comprehendit secundaria significatione per intellectuum medietatem,” In ̕PH, p. ̕PH II. ̕PH II.

Ari. ̕PH, Ch. ̕PH esp. ̕PH ̕PH

As he gives the reference, Kretzmann’s interpretation of Stoic logic is under Mates’s influence. According to Mates, Stoic’s lekton is Sinn in Frege and intension in Carnap. Against Nuchelmans’ criticism of Mates (Nuchelmans ̕PH, pp. ̕PH), it would be justified to hold that lekton is neither a mental entity nor a thing itself but Mates’s interpretation itself cannot avoid criticism. See Frede.

As to the dictum in Abelard and the doctrine of dictum after Abelard, see Nuchelmans ̕PH pp. ̕PH.

As to the development of “terminism,” see De Rijk.

In his claims for this labelling, Kretzmann refers to ̕PH and ̕PH in Peri hermeneias. In these passages, Aristotle says that affirmation is a statement affirming something of something while negation is a statement denying something of something.

“[D]ictum est tres esse apud Peripateticos orationes, unam quae litteris scriberetur, aliam quae proferretur in voce, tertiam quae coniungatur et geretur in animo.” In ̕PH, p. ̕PH II. ̕PH

In On Trinity, Augustine defines the word two-fold: “In one sense we give the name of word to whatever occupies a space of time with its syllables, whether it is spoken or merely thought; in another, everything that is known is called a word impressed on the conscious, as long as it can be produced from the memory and described, even when we dislike it” (De trinitate, IX, ̕PH). The latter is so-called “inward locution,” which is later described as “the thought formed from the thing we
know” and “a word that is neither Greek nor Latin nor any other language” (De trinitate, XV, 5). The English translation is quoted from E. Hill, The Trinity (New York: New City Press, 1982).

Magee, p. 34; p. 35; p. 36

Magee, p. 64

Magee, p. 12

Magee, p. 53

Magee, p. 62

Cf. Magee, pp. 34-35

The similar content of this paper is previously published in French as De Rijk, p. 34

De Rijk, p. 64

In Ackrill’s translation, “spoken sounds.”

In PH, p. 34-35

In PH, p. 34-35

Magee, pp. 34-35

In PH, p. 34-35

Terence Irwin and Paul Vincent Spade seem to say that there is a theory of signification rather than a theory of meaning in Aristotle and Boethius respectably because “signification” (semanein / significare) is different from “meaning.”

In Aristotle, the existence of the mental discourse is only briefly suggested in Post. Anal. I, ch. An “analytic” commentator such as John Ackrill claims it “fortunate” that Aristotle’s remark on the affections of the soul in the beginning of Peri hermeneias does not have a decisive influence on the rest of the work. Ackrill, p. 34-35

De Rijk, p. 34-35

Shiel and Arens are the representative scholars who take this view.

At a glance, the representative scholars supporting each thesis are: a) Ammonius: Pierre Courcelle p. 34-35. Rejected today by almost all scholars. b) Apuleius: Mark Sullivan pp. 34-35. Developing Jean Isaac’s thesis that Apuleius’ Peri hermeneias and Boethius’ De syllogismis categoricis have the same source, Sullivan proposed that Apuleius’ influence on Boethius is probably direct. c) The Stoics: Normann Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump often point out the Stoics’ influence on
Boethius' logical works. d) Proclus: Howard Patch and John Magee argue that Proclus' Commentary on Timaeus has a significant influence upon Boethius. e) Augustine: Henry Chadwick pp. 20-22.

The project of making an English translation of the massive commentaries, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle" is currently being directed by Richard Sorabji. For the detail, see the web-site of the project, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/frames/Research/aca/index.html

Magee pp. 20-22.

Cf. Whitaker, pp. 20-22.

In PH, p. 52 ll. 9-11.

Marenbon p. 156 uses this expression in his explanation of Boethius' commentary on Peri hermeneias.

In PH, p. 52 ll. 16-19. Magee p. 156 misinterprets this sentence and makes the issue too complicated.

In PH, p. 52 ll. 9-11.

He claims that the sentence which comprises more than one verb (and one noun) is a "composite" sentence.

Kretzmann, though not saying explicitly, appears to give a negative judgement about his Boethius. Arens is completely negative on the philosophical value of Boethius' commentary. For example, he comments: "The start is wrong, the description of phonation of the poorest, his pseudo-deduction is evident. — It is hard to believe that this is the beginning of a book on logic." (Arens p. 156.)

Cf. Kneale, pp. 20-22 proposes that Aristotle's mistakes in chapter of De interpretatione are clearly identified if we introduce distinctions among (i) "a token-sentence," (ii) "a type-sentence," (iii) "a statement in the grammarian's sense," (iv) "make a statement," (v) "a proposition or propositional content," and (vi) "a designation of a proposition."

Russell p. 156.

Strawson p. 156.

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